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Abstract. Many individuals share their opinions (e.g., on political is-
sues) or sensitive information about them (e.g., health status) on the
internet in an anonymous way to protect their privacy. However, anony-
mous data sharing has been becoming more challenging in today’s inter-
connected digital world, especially for individuals that have both anony-
mous and identified online activities. The most prominent example of
such data sharing platforms today are online social networks (OSNs).
Many individuals have multiple profiles in different OSNs, including
anonymous and identified ones (depending on the nature of the OSN).
Here, the privacy threat is profile matching: if an attacker links anony-
mous profiles of individuals to their real identities, it can obtain privacy-
sensitive information which may have serious consequences, such as dis-
crimination or blackmailing. Therefore, it is very important to quantify
and show to the OSN users the extent of this privacy risk. Existing
attempts to model profile matching in OSNs are inadequate and compu-
tationally inefficient for real-time risk quantification. Thus, in this work,
we develop algorithms to efficiently model and quantify profile match-
ing attacks in OSNs as a step towards real-time privacy risk quantifica-
tion. For this, we model the profile matching problem using a graph and
develop a belief propagation (BP)-based algorithm to solve this prob-
lem in a significantly more efficient and accurate way compared to the
state-of-the-art. We evaluate the proposed framework on three real-life
datasets (including data from four different social networks) and show
how users’ profiles in different OSNs can be matched efficiently and with
high probability. We show that the proposed model generation has linear
complexity in terms of number of user pairs, which is significantly more
efficient than the state-of-the-art (which has cubic complexity). Further-
more, it provides comparable accuracy, precision, and recall compared
to state-of-the-art. Thanks to the algorithms that are developed in this
work, individuals will be more conscious when sharing data on online
platforms. We anticipate that this work will also drive the technology so
that new privacy-centered products can be offered by the OSNs.
Keywords: Social networks · profile matching · deanonymization · pri-
vacy risk quantification.
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1 Introduction
Many individuals, to preserve their privacy and to protect themselves against
potential damaging consequences, choose to share content anonymously in the
digital space. For instance, people share their opinions about different topics or
sensitive information about themselves (e.g., their health status) without sharing
their real identities, hoping that they will remain anonymous. Unfortunately, this
is non-trivial in today’s interconnected world, in which different activities of indi-
viduals can be linked to each other. An attacker, by linking anonymous activities
of individuals to their real identities (via other publicly available and identified
information about them), can obtain privacy-sensitive information about them.
Thus, individuals need tools that show them the scale of their vulnerability
against such privacy risks when they share content. In this work, we tackle this
problem by focusing on data sharing on online social networks (OSNs).
An OSN is a platform, in which, individuals share vast amount of information
about themselves such as their social and professional life, hobbies, diseases,
friends, and opinions. Via OSNs, people also get in touch with other people
that share similar interests or that they already know in real-life [8]. With the
widespread availability of the Internet, OSNs have been a part of our lives more
than ever. Most individuals have multiple OSN profiles for different purposes.
Furthermore, each OSN offers different services via different frameworks, leading
individuals share different types of information [8]. Also, in some OSNs, users
reveal their real identities (e.g., to find old friends), while in some OSNs, users
prefer to remain anonymous (especially in OSNs in which users share anonymous
opinions or sensitive information about themselves, such as their health status).
Here, the privacy risk is the deanonymization of the anonymous OSN profile of
a user using their other OSN profiles, in which the user is identified.
Such profile matching across OSNs (i.e., identifying profiles belonging to the
same individuals) is a serious privacy threat, especially for individuals that have
anonymous profiles in some OSNs and reveal their real identities in others. If
an attacker can link anonymous profiles of individuals to their real identities, it
can obtain privacy-sensitive information about individuals that is not intended
to be linked to their real identities. Such sensitive information can then be used
for discrimination or blackmailing. Thus, it is very important to quantify and
show the risk of such profile matching attacks in an efficient and accurate way.
An OSN can be characterized by (i) its graphical structure (i.e., connections
between its users) and (ii) the attributes of its users (i.e., types of information
that is shared by its users). The graphical structures of most popular OSNs
show strong resemblance to social connections of individuals in real-life (e.g.,
Facebook). Existing work shows that this fact can be utilized to link accounts
of individuals from different OSNs [28]. However, without sufficient background
information, just using graphical structure for profile matching becomes com-
putationally infeasible. Furthermore, some OSNs or online platforms either do
not have a graphical structure at all (e.g., forums) or their graphical structures
do not resemble the real-life connections of the individuals (e.g., health-related
OSNs such as PatientsLikeMe [3]). In these types of OSNs, an attacker can uti-
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lize the attributes of the users for profile matching. Thus, to show the scale of
the profile matching threat, it is crucial to process both the graphical structure
and the other attributes of the users in an efficient and accurate way.
In this work, we efficiently model the profile matching problem in OSNs by
considering both the graphical structure and other attributes of the users, a step
towards delivering real-time information to OSN users about their privacy risks
for profile matching due to their sharings on online platforms. Designing efficient
privacy risk quantification tools is non-trivial, especially considering the scale of
the problem. To overcome this challenge, we develop a novel, graph-based model
generation algorithm to solve the profile matching problem in a significantly
more efficient and accurate way than the state-of-the-art.
We formulate the profile matching problem as finding the marginal probabil-
ity distributions of random variables representing the possible matches between
user profile pairs from the joint probability distribution of many variables. We
factorize the joint probability distribution into simpler local functions to com-
pute the marginal probability distributions efficiently. To do so, we formulate the
model generation for profile matching by using a graph-based algorithm. That
is, we formulate the problem on a factor graph and develop a novel belief prop-
agation (BP)-based algorithm to generate the model efficiently and accurately
(compared to the state-of-the-art). The outcome of the model generation will
pave the way towards developing real-time risk quantification tools (i.e., inform
users about their privacy loss and its consequences as they share new content).
Our results show that the proposed model generation algorithm can match
user profiles with an accuracy of up to 90% (depending on the amount of infor-
mation and attributes that users share). As more information is collected about
the users profiles in social networks, the accuracy of the BP-based algorithm
increases. Also, by analyzing the effect of social networks’ size to obtained preci-
sion and recall values, we show the scalability of the proposed model generation
algorithm. We also show that by controlling the structure of the proposed graph-
ical model, we can simultaneously improve the efficiency of the proposed model
generation algorithm and increase its accuracy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the
related work. In Section 3, we provide the threat model. In Section 4, we describe
the proposed framework in detail. In Section 5, we implement and evaluate
the proposed framework using real-life datasets belonging to various OSNs. In
Section 6, we discuss how the proposed scheme can be used for real-time privacy
risk quantification, potential mitigation techniques, and generalization of the
proposed scheme for different OSNs. Finally, in Section 7, we conclude the paper.
2 Related Work
Several works in the literature have proposed profile matching schemes that
leverage network structure, publicly available attributes of the users, or both
of them. Profile matching based only on network (graph) structure is widely
known as the deanonymization problem. Graph deanonymization (DA) attacks
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can be classified as (i) seed-based attacks [15, 17, 18, 28, 29], in which a set of
seeds (users’ accounts in two different networks which belong to the same in-
dividual) are known; and (ii) seed-free attacks [32, 38], in which no seeds are
used. Narayanan and Shmatikov were among the first that proposed a graph
deanonymization algorithm [28]. Nilizadeh et al. [29] improved the attack pro-
posed by Narayanan et al. by proposing a community-level deanonymization
attack. Korula and Lattanzi [18] proposed a DA attack that by starting from
a set of seeds, iteratively matches user pairs with the most number of neigh-
boring mapped pairs. Ji et al. [15] quantified the deanonymizability of social
networks from a theoretical perspective (i.e., focusing on social networks that
follow a distribution model). Pedarsani et al. [32] proposed a Bayesian-based
model to match users across social networks without using seeds. Their model
uses node degrees and distances to other nodes. Sharad et al. [35] showed that
users’ re-identification (deanonymization) in anonymized social networks can
be automated. Ji et al. [16] evaluated several anonymization techniques and
deanonymization attacks and showed that all state-of-art anonymization tech-
niques are vulnerable to modern deanonymization attacks. Recently, Zhou et
al. [42] proposed DeepLink, a deep neural network based algorithm that lever-
ages network structure for user linkage.
Another line of works [10,13,14,22,23,25,26,30,33,37,40,41] have leveraged
public information in the users’ profiles (such as user name, profile photo, de-
scription, location, and number of friends) for profile matching. Shu et al. [36]
provided a broad review of the works that use public information for profile
matching. Malhotra et al. [25] built classifiers on various attributes to deter-
mine whether two user profiles are matching or not. On the other hand, Za-
farani et al. [41] explored user name by analyzing the behaviour patterns of the
users, the language used, and the writing style to link users across social media
sites. Goga et al. [10] showed that attributes that are hard to be controlled by
users, such as location, activity, and writing style, may be sufficient for profile
matching. Liu et al. [24] proposed a framework that mainly consists of three
steps: behavior similarity modeling, structure consistency modeling, and multi-
objective optimization. Goga et al. [11] conducted a detailed analysis of user
profiles and their attributes identifying four properties: availability, consistency,
non-impersonability, and discriminability. Andreou et al. [5] combined attribute
and identity disclosure across social networks. Recently, Halimi et al. [12] pro-
posed a more accurate profile matching framework based on machine learning
techniques and optimization algorithms. One common thing about most of these
aforementioned approaches is that they rely on training classifiers to determine
whether a user pair is a match or not. We implemented some of these approaches
and compared with the proposed framework in Section 5.
Contribution of this paper: Previous works show that there exists a non-
negligible risk of matching user profiles on offline datasets. Showing the risk on
offline datasets is not effective since users need tools that guide them at the time
of data sharing in digital world. However, building algorithms that will pave
the way towards real-time privacy risk quantification is non-trivial considering
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the scale of the problem. In this paper, we develop a novel belief propagation
(BP)-based algorithm to generate the model efficiently and accurately (com-
pared to the state-of-the-art). The proposed algorithm has linear complexity
with respect to the number of user pairs (i.e., possible matches), while Hungar-
ian algorithm [20], state-of-the-art that provides the highest accuracy (as shown
in Section 5.4), has cubic complexity with respect to the number of users. We
also show that the proposed algorithm achieves comparable accuracy with the
Hungarian algorithm while providing this efficiency advantage.
3 Threat Model
We assume the attacker has access to user profiles in different OSNs. For sim-
plicity we consider two OSNs: user profiles in OSN A (the auxiliary OSN) are
linked to their identities, while in OSN T (the target OSN), the profiles of the
individuals are anonymized. The attacker’s goal is to match one or multiple user
profiles from OSN T to the profiles in OSN A in order to determine the real
identities of the users in OSN T . To do such profile matching, we assume that
the attacker can only use the publicly available attributes of the users from OSNs
A and T .
We study the extent of profile matching risk by means of two attacks: targeted
attack and global attack. Targeted attack represents a scenario in which the
attacker identifies the anonymous profile of a victim (or a set of victims) in OSN
T and aims to find the corresponding unanonymized profile of the same victim
in OSN A. Global attack represents the case in which the attacker aims to link
all profiles in OSN T to their corresponding matches in OSN A.
4 Proposed Model Generation
Let A and T represent the auxiliary and the target OSNs, respectively, in which
people publicly share attributes such as date of birth, gender, and location. We
represent the profile of a user i in either A or T as Uki , where k ∈ {A, T}. We
focus on the most common attributes that are shared in many OSNs and we
categorize the profile of a user i as Uki = {nki , `ki , gki , pki , fki , aki , tki , ski , rki }, where
n denotes the user name, ` denotes the location, g denotes the gender, p denotes
the profile photo, f denotes the freetext provided by the user in the profile
description, a denotes the activity patterns of the user (i.e., time instances at
which the user posts), t denotes the interests of the user (based on the sharings of
the user), s denotes the sentiment profile of the user, and r denotes the (graph)
connectivity pattern of the user. As discussed, the main goal of the attacker is
to link the profiles between two OSNs. The overview of the proposed framework
is shown in Figure 1. In the following, we describe the details of the proposed
model generation algorithm.
4.1 Categorizing Attributes and Defining Similarity Metrics
Once the attributes of the users are extracted from their profiles, we first catego-
rize them so that we can use them to compute the similarity values of attributes
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Attributes Categorization
Model Generation
Data Collection
𝑼𝟏
𝑨 𝑼𝟐
𝑨 𝑼𝟑
𝑨 𝑼𝟒
𝑨 𝑼𝑵
𝑨
𝑼𝟏
𝑻 𝑼𝟐
𝑻 𝑼𝟑
𝑻 𝑼𝟒
𝑻 𝑼𝑴
𝑻
?
…
…
𝑼𝒊
𝑨:
profile of user 𝒋 in social network 𝑻
profile of user 𝒊 in social network 𝑨
𝑼𝒋
𝑻: gj: factor node of 𝑼𝒋
𝑻
fi: factor node of 𝑼𝒊
𝑨
xij: variable node of user pair (𝑼𝒊
𝑨, 𝑼𝒋
𝑻)
X1,1 X1,2 X2,1 X2,2
f1 f2 g1 g2
X3,1 X3,2
f3 … fN g3 … gM
xN,3 xN,M…
OSN A OSN T
User PairsOSN A
OSN T
Fig. 1. Overview of the proposed framework. The proposed framework consists of 3
main steps: (1) data collection, (2) categorization of attributes and computation of
attribute similarities, and (3) generation of the model.
between different users. In this section, we define the similarity metrics for each
attribute between a user i in OSN A and user j in OSN T .
User name similarity - S(nAi , n
T
j ): We use Levenshtein distance [21] to com-
pute the similarity between user names of profiles.
Location similarity - S(`Ai , `
T
j ): Location information collected from the users’
profiles is usually text-based. We convert the textual information into coordi-
nates via GoogleMaps API [1] and calculate the geographic distance between
the corresponding coordinates.
Gender similarity - S(gAi , g
T
j ): Availability of gender information is mostly
problematic in OSNs. Some OSNs do not publicly share the gender information
of their users. Furthermore, some OSNs do not even collect this information. In
our model, if an OSN does not provide the gender information publicly (or does
not have such information), we probabilistically infer the gender information
by using a public name database. That is, we use the US social security name
database3 and look for a profile’s name (or user name) to probabilistically infer
the possible gender of the profile from the distribution of the corresponding name
(among males and females) in the name database. We then use this probability
as the S(gAi , g
T
j ) value between two profiles.
Profile photo similarity - S(pAi , p
T
j ): We calculate the profile photo similarity
through a framework named OpenFace [4]. OpenFace is an open source tool
performing face recognition. OpenFace first detects the face (in the photo), and
3 US social security name database includes year of birth, gender, and the correspond-
ing name for babies born in the United States.
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then preprocesses it to create a normalized and fixed-size input for the neural
network. The features that characterize a person’s face are extracted by the
neural network and then used in classifiers or clustering techniques. OpenFace
notably offers higher accuracy than previous open source frameworks. Given two
profile photos pAi and p
T
j , OpenFace returns the photo similarity, S(p
A
i , p
T
j ), as
a real value between 0 (meaning exactly the same photo) and 4.
Freetext similarity - S(fAi , f
T
j ): Freetext data in an OSN profile could be
a short biographical text or an “about me” page. We use NER (named-entity
recognition) [9] to extract features from the freetext information. The extracted
features are location, person, organization, money, percent, date, and time. To
calculate the freetext similarity between the profiles of two users, we use the
cosine similarity between the extracted features from each user.
Activity pattern similarity - S(aAi , a
T
j ): To compute the activity pattern sim-
ilarity, we find the similarity between observed activity patterns of two profiles
(e.g., likes or post). Let aAi represent a vector including the times of last |aAi |
activities of user i in OSN A. Similarly, aTj is a vector including the times of last
|aTj | activities of user j in OSN T . First, we compute the time difference between
every entry in aAi and a
T
j and we determine min(|aAi |, |aTj |) pairs whose time dif-
ference is the smallest. Then, we compute the normalized distance between these
min(|aAi |, |aTj |) pairs to compute the activity pattern similarity between two pro-
files.
Interest similarity - S(tAi , t
T
j ): OSNs provide a platform in which users share
their opinions via posts (e.g., tweets or tips), and this shared content is com-
posed of different topics. In highlevel, first, we create a topic model using Latent
Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) [7]. Then, by using the created model, we compute
the topic distribution of each post generated by the users of the auxiliary and
the target OSNs. Finally, we compute the interest similarity from the distance
of the computed topic distributions.
Sentiment similarity - S(sAi , s
T
j ): Users typically express their emotions when
sharing their opinions about certain issues on OSNs. To determine whether the
shared text (e.g., post or tweet) expresses positive or negative sentiment we
use sentiment analysis through Python NLTK (natural language toolkit) Text
Classification [2]. Given the text to analyze, the sentiment analysis tool returns
the probability for positive and negative sentiment in the text. Users’ moods are
affected from different factors, so it is realistic to assume that they might change
by time (e.g., daily). Thus, we compute the daily sentiment profile of each user,
and daily sentiment similarity between the users. For this, first, we compute the
normalized distribution of the positive and negative sentiments per day for each
user, and then we find the normalized distance between these distributions for
each user pair.
Graph connectivity similarity - S(rAi , r
T
j ): As in [35], for each user i, we
define a feature vector Fi = (c0, c1, ..., cn−1) of length n made up of components
of size b. Each component contains the number of neighbors that have a degree
in a particular range, e.g., ck is the count of neighbors with a degree in range
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[k · b, (k + 1) · b]. We use the feature vector length as 70 and bin size as 15 (as
in [35]).
4.2 Generating the Model
We denote the set of profiles that are extracted for training from OSNs A and
T as At and Tt, respectively. Profiles are selected such that some profiles in At
and Tt belong to the same individual. We let set G include pairs of profiles
(UAi , U
T
j ) from At and Tt that belong to the same individual (i.e., coupled
profiles). Similarly, we let set I include pairs of profiles that belong to different
individuals (i.e., uncoupled profiles). For each pair of users in sets G and I, we
compute the attribute similarities based on the categorizations of the attributes
(as discussed in Section 4.1). We label the pairs in sets G and I (as coupled and
uncoupled) and add them to the training dataset. Then, to identify the weight
(contribution) of each attribute, we use logistic regression.
Next, we select the profiles to be matched and construct the sets Ae (with size
N) and Te (with size M). Then, we compute the general similarity S(U
A
i , U
T
j )
between every user in Ae and Te using the identified weights of the attributes
to obtain the N ×M similarity matrix R. Our goal is to obtain a one-to-one
matching between the users in Ae and Te that would also maximize the total
similarity. One way of solving this problem is to formulate it as an optimiza-
tion problem and use the Hungarian algorithm, a combinatorial optimization
algorithm that solves the assignment problem in polynomial time [20]. It is also
possible to formulate profile matching as a classification problem and solve it
using machine learning algorithms. Thus, we evaluate and compare the solution
of this problem by using both the Hungarian algorithm and other off-the-shelf
machine learning algorithms including k-nearest neighbor (KNN), decision tree,
random forest, and SVM.
Evaluations on different datasets (we will provide the details of the datasets
later in Section 5.2) show us that Hungarian algorithm provides significantly
better precision, recall, and accuracy compared to other machine learning tech-
niques (we will provide the details of our evaluation in Section 5.4). However,
assuming N users in set Ae and M users in set Te, the running time of the Hun-
garian algorithm for the above scenario is O(max{N,M}3), and hence it is not
scalable for large datasets. This raises the need for efficient, accurate, and scal-
able algorithms for model generation that will pave the way towards real-time
privacy risk quantification.
4.3 Belief Propagation-Based Efficient Formulation of Model
Generation
Inspired from the effective use of the message passing algorithms in information
theory [34] and reputation management [6], in this research, for the first time,
we formulate profile matching as an inference problem that infers the coupled
profile pairs and develop an algorithm that relies on belief propagation (BP)
on a graphical model. BP algorithm is based on a message-passing strategy
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for performing efficient inference using graphical models [31]. The problem we
consider is different from [6, 34] and so is the formulation. In this section we
formalize our approach and present the different components that are needed to
quantify the profile matching risk. Our goal is to obtain comparable precision,
recall, and accuracy values as in the Hungarian algorithm with significantly
better efficiency.
We represent the marginal probability distribution for a profile pair (i, j) to
be a coupled pair as p(xi,j), where xi,j = 1 if profiles are matched as a result of
the algorithm and xi,j = 0, otherwise. Then, we formulate the profile matching
(i.e., determining if a profile pair is coupled or uncoupled) as computing the
marginal probability distributions of the variables in set X = {xi,j : i ∈ A, j ∈
T}, given the similarity values between the user pairs in the similarity matrix
R. Since the number of users in OSNs is high, it is computationally infeasible to
compute the marginal probability distributions from the joint probability distri-
bution p(X|R). Thus, we propose to factorize p(X|R) into local functions using
a factor graph and run the BP algorithm to compute the marginal probability
distributions in linear time (with respect to the number of profile pairs).
A factor graph is a bipartite graph containing two sets of nodes (variable
and factor nodes) and edges between these two sets. We form a factor graph by
setting a variable node for each variable xi,j (i.e., each profile pair). Thus, each
variable node represents the marginal probability distribution of that profile pair
being coupled or uncoupled. We use two types of factor nodes: (i) “auxiliary”
factor node (fi), representing each user i in OSN A and (ii) “target” factor node
(gj), representing each user j in OSN T . Each factor node is connected to the
variable nodes representing its potential matches. Factor nodes represent the
statistical relationships between the user attributes and profile matching. Using
the factor nodes, the joint probability distribution function can be factorized
into products of several local functions, as follows:
p(X|R) = 1
Z
 N∏
i=1
fi(xσfi , R)
M∏
j=1
gj(xσgj , R)
 , (1)
where Z is a normalization constant, and σfi (or σgj) represents the indices of
the variable nodes that are connected to factor node fi (or gj).
Figure 2 shows the factor graph representation of a toy example with 3 users
from OSN A and 2 users from OSN T . Here, each user corresponds to a factor
node in the graph (shown as a hexagon or rhombus, respectively). Each profile
pair is represented by a variable node and shown as a rectangle. Each factor node
is connected to the variable nodes it acts on. For example fi is connected to all
variable nodes (profile pairs) that contain UAi . The BP algorithm iteratively
exchanges messages between the variable and the factor nodes, updating the
beliefs on the values of the profile pairs (i.e., being a coupled or an uncoupled
profile) at each iteration, until convergence.
Next, we introduce the messages between the variable and the factor nodes to
compute the marginal distributions using BP. We denote the messages from the
variable nodes to the factor nodes as µ. We also denote the messages from the
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auxiliary factor nodes to the variable nodes as λ and from the target factor nodes
to the variable nodes as β. The message µ
(v+1)
k→i
(
x
(v)
i,j
)
denotes the probability
of xvi,j = r (r ∈ {0, 1}), at the vth iteration. Also, λ(v)i→k
(
x
(v)
i,j
)
denotes the
probability that xvi,j = r (r ∈ {0, 1}) at the vth iteration given R (the messages
β can be also expressed similarly). In the following, we describe the message
exchange between the variable node x1,4, the auxiliary factor node f1, and the
target factor node g4 in Figure 2. For clarity of presentation, we denote the
variable and factor nodes x1,4, f1, and g4 as i, k, z, respectively.
(a) (b)
𝑼𝟐
𝑨
𝑼𝟒
𝑻
𝑼𝟓
𝑻
𝑼𝟏
𝑨
A           T
𝑼𝟑
𝑨
i
k z
X1,4 X1,5 X2,4 X2,5
f1 f2 g4 g5
X3,4 X3,5
f3
Fig. 2. Factor graph representation of 3
users from OSN A and 2 users from OSN
T . (a) The users in both OSNs A and
T . (b) Factor graph representation of all
the possible profile pairs combinations
between users in OSNs A and T .
Following the general rules of BP [19],
the variable node i generates its message
to auxiliary factor node k by multiplying
all the messages it receives from its neigh-
bors, excluding k. Note that each variable
node has only two neighbors (one aux-
iliary factor node and one target factor
node). Thus, the message from the vari-
able node i to the auxiliary factor node
k at the vth iteration is as follows:
µ
(v)
i→k
(
x
(v)
1,4
)
= β
(v−1)
z→i
(
x
(v−1)
1,4
)
. (2)
This computation is done at every vari-
able node. The message from the variable
node i to the target factor node z is also constructed similarly.
Next, factor nodes generate their messages. The message from the auxiliary
factor node k to the variable node i is given by:
λ
(v)
k→i
(
x
(v)
1,4
)
=
1
Z
× S(UA1 , UT4 )×
∏
d∈(∼i)
fd
(
µ
(v)
d→k
(
x
(v)
1,4
))
, (3)
where (∼ i) means all variable node neighbors of k, except i. We compute func-
tion fd as:
fd
(
µ
(v)
d→k
(
x
(v)
1,4
))
=
(
1− µ(v)d→k
(
x
(v)
1,4
))
. (4)
The above computation must be performed for every neighbor of each auxiliary
factor node. The message from the target factor node z to the variable node i is
also computed similarly.
The next iteration is performed in the same way as the vth iteration. The al-
gorithm starts at the variable nodes. In the first iteration (i.e., v = 1), all the vari-
able nodes send to their neighboring factor nodes the same value (λ
(1)
i→k
(
x
(1)
i,j
)
=
1/N), where N is the total number of “auxiliary” factor nodes. The iterations
stops when the probability distributions of all variables in X converge. The
marginal probability distribution of each variable in X is computed by multi-
plying all the incoming messages at each variable node.
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4.4 -Accurate Model Generation
We also study the limitations and properties of the proposed BP-based model
generation algorithm. We particularly analyze if the proposed algorithm main-
tains any optimality in any sense. For this, we use the following definition:
Definition 1. -accurate model generation. We declare a model generation
algorithm as -accurate if it can match at least % of the users accurately.
Here, accuracy is the number of correctly matched coupled pairs by the proposed
algorithm over the total number of coupled pairs. The above definition can also
be made in terms of precision or recall (or both) of the proposed algorithm.
Thus, for a fixed , we study the conditions for an -accurate algorithm. This
also helps us understand the limits of profile matching in OSNs. To have an
-accurate algorithm with a high  value, it can be shown that, we require the
BP-based algorithm to iteratively increase the accuracy until it converges. This
brings about the following sufficient condition about -accuracy.
Definition 2. Sufficient Condition. Accuracy of the model generation al-
gorithm increases with each successive iteration (until convergence) if for all
coupled profiles i and j, Pr(x
(2)
i,j = 1) > Pr(x
(1)
i,j = 1) is satisfied.
Depending on the fraction of the coupled profile pairs that meet the sufficient
condition, -accuracy of the proposed algorithm can be obtained. In Section 5,
we experimentally explore the cases in which this sufficient condition is satisfied
with high probability.
5 Evaluation of the Proposed Mechanism
In this section, we evaluate the proposed BP-based algorithm by using real
data from four OSNs. We also study the impact of various parameters to the
-accuracy of the proposed algorithm.
5.1 Evaluation Metrics
To evaluate the proposed model, we mainly consider the global attack, in which
the goal of the attacker is to match all profiles in Ae to all profiles in Te. In
other words, the goal is to deanonymize all anonymous users in the target OSN
(who have accounts in the auxiliary OSN). For the evaluation metrics, we use
precision, recall, and accuracy. Hungarian algorithm and the proposed BP-based
algorithm provide a one-to-one match between all the users. However, we cannot
expect that all anonymous users in the target OSN have profiles in the auxil-
iary OSN. Therefore, some of the provided matches are useless for us. Thus,
we select a “similarity threshold” (“probability threshold” for machine learning
techniques) for evaluation. Each matching scheme returns 1 (i.e., true match) if
the similarity/probability of user pair is higher than the threshold, and 0 oth-
erwise. So, we consider as true positives the pairs that are correctly matched
by the algorithm and whose similarity/probability is greater than the threshold.
We also compute accuracy as the number of correctly matched coupled pairs
identified by the algorithm over the total number of coupled pairs.
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5.2 Data Collection
To evaluate our proposed framework, we use three datasets: (i) Dataset 1 (D1):
Google+ - Twitter [12], (ii) Dataset 2 (D2): Instagram - Twitter, and (iii)
Dataset 3 (D3): Flickr social graph [39]. To collect the coupled profiles in D1 and
D2, social links in Google+ profiles and about.me (a social network where users
provide links to their OSN profiles) were used, respectively. In terms of dataset
sizes, (i) D1 consists of 8000 users in each OSNs where 4000 of them are coupled
profiles; (ii) D2 consists of more than 10000 coupled profiles (and more content
about the OSN users compared to D1); and (iii) D3 consists of 50000 users. In
D1, we use Twitter as our auxiliary OSN (A) and Google+ as our target OSN
(T ); in D2, we use Twitter as our auxiliary OSN (A) and Instagram as our target
OSN (T ); and in D3, we generate the auxiliary and the target OSN graphs as
in [27,35] by using a vertex overlap of 1 and an edge overlap of 0.9.
5.3 Evaluation Settings
Since the model generation process is the same for all three datasets, in the rest
of the paper, we hold the discussion over a target and auxiliary network. From
each dataset, we select 3000 profile pairs (1500 coupled and 1500 uncoupled) for
training. We also select 500 users from the auxiliary OSN and 500 users from the
target OSN to construct sets Ae and Te, respectively. Note that none of these
users are involved in the training set. Among these profiles, we have 500 coupled
pairs and 249500 uncoupled pairs, and hence the goal is to make sure that
these 500 users are matched with high confidence in a global attack scenario.
Note that we do not use cross-validation because we consider all the possible
user combinations to test our model and it is time-consuming to compute all
similarity metrics for all combinations. Considering all the combinations instead
of randomly selecting some user pairs is a more realistic evaluation setting since
one can never know which users pairs the attacker will have access to. In cases
that there are missing attributes (that are not published by the users) in the
dataset, we assign a value for the attribute similarity based on the distributions
of the attribute similarity values between the coupled and uncoupled pairs.
5.4 Evaluation of BP-Based Model Generation
In Figure 3, we show the comparison of the proposed BP-based model generation
to [11,12,25,30,35] for each dataset (D1, D2, and D3). [11,25,30,35] use machine
learning-based techniques (k-nearest neighbor (KNN), decision tree, random for-
est, and/or SVM), while [12] uses the Hungarian Algorithm. Our results show
that the proposed scheme provides comparable precision and recall compared to
the state-of-the-art Hungarian algorithm and it significantly outpowers machine
leaning-based algorithms. For instance, the proposed algorithm provides a pre-
cision value of around 0.97 (for a similarity threshold of 0.5) in D1. This means,
if our proposed algorithm returns a matched profile pair that has a similarity
value above 0.5, the corresponding profiles belong to same individual with a high
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confidence. At the same time, the complexity of the proposed algorithm scales
linearly with the number of user pairs, while the Hungarian algorithm suffers
from cubic complexity. Note that precision and recall values obtained from D2
are higher compared to the ones from D1 as we collected more information about
users in D2. We also compare the BP-based model generation to the deep neural
network based algorithm (DeepLink) [42] in D3. For DeepLink, we use the same
settings as in [42]. DeepLink achieves an accuracy of 84% in D3 which is slightly
less than the one obtained by the proposed algorithm (90%). DeepLink achieves
a precision of 0.84, and a recall of 1 while the BP-based algorithm achieves a
precision of 0.93 and a recall of 0.9. DeepLink provides a match for each user
even if that user does not have a match.
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Fig. 3. Comparison of the proposed BP-based scheme with the Hungarian algorithm
and machine learning techniques (decision tree - DT, KNN, random forest - RF, and
SVM) in terms of precision and recall for D1, D2, and D3.
We also study the effect of the OSNs’ size to precision and recall of the
proposed algorithm. In Figure 4, for each dataset, we show the precision/recall
values of the BP-based algorithm when the number of users in the auxiliary
OSN (OSN A) increases while the number of target users (i.e., users in OSN
T ) is fixed. We set the number of users in OSN T as 100 and increase the
number of users in OSN A from 100 to 1000 in steps of 100. We observe that
the precision/recall values of the proposed algorithm only slightly decrease with
the increase of auxiliary OSN’s size, which shows the scalability of our proposed
algorithm. We achieve similar results for the other two scenarios: (i) when we
fix the number of users in OSN A and vary the number of users in OSN T ; and
(ii) when we increase the number of users in both OSNs A and T . Due to the
space constraints, we present the details of the results of scenarios (i) and (ii) in
Figures 7 and 8, respectively, in Appendix A.
Next, we evaluate the -accuracy of the proposed model generation algorithm
(introduced in Section 4.4). There are many parameters to consider to analyze
the -accuracy of the proposed algorithm, such as the average degree of factor
nodes, total similarity of each user in the target OSN with the ones in the
auxiliary OSN, and number of users in the target and auxiliary OSNs. Here,
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Fig. 4. The effect of auxiliary OSN’s (OSN A) size to precision/recall when the size of
target OSN (OSN T ) is 100 in D1, D2, and D3.
we experimentally analyze and show the -accuracy of the proposed algorithm
considering such parameters. For evaluation, we use all datasets and pick 500
users from OSN T . For all the studied parameters, we observe that at least 97%
of coupled profiles that can be correctly matched by the BP-based algorithm
satisfy the sufficient condition (introduced in Section 4.4). We observe that 
value is inversely proportional to the average degree of the factor nodes. In D1,
the -accuracy of the proposed algorithm is  = 67 and  = 84 when the average
degrees of the factor nodes are 500 and 22, respectively (we discuss more about
the results of this experiment in Section 5.5).
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Fig. 5. The effect of variance threshold to -
accuracy in D1 and D2. For “high variance”,
our goal is to match users in OSN T that have
a variance (for the similarity values between a
user in OSN T and all users in OSN A) greater
than the variance threshold, while for “low vari-
ance”, we consider users that have a variance
value smaller than the variance threshold.
To study the impact of user
pairs’ similarity, for each user in
OSN T , we compute the variance
of the similarity values between
that user and all users in OSN A.
Then, we compute the accuracy
of the proposed BP-based algo-
rithm on users with varying vari-
ance values. For evaluation, we
use D1 and D2. Our results show
that -accuracy of the proposed
algorithm is higher for users with
higher variances (as shown in Fig-
ure 5). For instance, in D1, we ob-
serve the -accuracy as  = 42 and
 = 90, when we run the proposed
algorithm only for the users with
low variance (lower than 0.008)
and high variance (higher than
0.012), respectively. These results show that the vulnerability of the users in
an OSN (for the profile matching attack) can be identified by analyzing partic-
ular characteristics of the OSNs.
Furthermore, we observe that  value is inversely proportional to the number
of users in OSN A (as shown in Figure 6). The proposed algorithm achieves
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an -accuracy of  = 82 and  = 72 in D1 when the number of users in A is
100 and 1000, respectively while the number of users in T is 100. This decrease
in accuracy can be considered as low considering that the number of possible
matches increases 10 times (from 10000 to 100000 user pairs). In D2, we observe
a similar trend to D1. In D3, accuracy decreases faster with the increase in
number of users in OSN A (compared to D1 and D2). This is because, in D3,
we only use the graph connectivity attribute for profile matching. Thus, as the
number of users in OSN A increases, the number of users with similar graph
connectivity patterns also increases causing the decrease in accuracy.
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Fig. 6. The effect of auxiliary OSN’s (OSN A) size to -accuracy in D1, D2, and D3.
The size of target OSN (OSN T ) is fixed to 100.
5.5 Complexity Analysis of the BP-Based Algorithm
Dataset Complexity Precision Recall Accuracy
D1
N2 0.978 0.944 67.4%
N
√
N 0.955 0.939 84.6%
N logN 0.975 0.966 96%
D2
N2 0.978 0.982 90.4%
N
√
N 0.977 0.954 94.8%
N logN 0.934 0.946 90.6%
D3
N2 0.925 0.976 90.4%
N
√
N 0.92 0.973 91%
N logN 0.932 0.976 95%
Table 1. Evaluation of the proposed BP-based
algorithm with varying the number of variable
nodes. N denotes the number of users in OSN T ,
and each value in the complexity column shows
the number of variable nodes (i.e., the number
of users pairs used for profile matching).
The complexity of the BP-based
algorithm is linear in the num-
ber of variable (or factor nodes).
In the proposed BP-based al-
gorithm, we generate a variable
node for all potential matches be-
tween the target and the auxil-
iary OSNs. Assuming N users in
both target and auxiliary OSNs,
this results in N2 variable nodes
in the graph. To analyze the ef-
fect of number of variable nodes
on the performance, we experi-
mentally try to change the graph
structure and limit the number of
variable nodes for each user in the
target OSN. We heuristically de-
crease the average degree of the
factor nodes from N to
√
N and logN by only leaving the variable nodes (user
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pairs) with the highest similarity values. For evaluation, we use all datasets (D1,
D2, and D3). We pick 500 users from OSNs A and T to construct the test dataset
(where there are 500 coupled and 249500 uncoupled profile pairs initially). In
Table 1, we show the results with varying number of variable nodes. For in-
stance, in D1, we obtain an accuracy of 67.4% when all the potential matches
are considered (i.e., with N variable nodes for each user in T ) and an accuracy
of 96% when we use only logN variable nodes for each user. These results are
important since they show that while reducing the complexity of the proposed
BP-based algorithm, we can further improve its accuracy.
6 Discussion
In this section we discuss how the proposed framework can be utilized for sen-
sitive OSNs, and potential mitigation techniques against the identified profile
matching risk.
6.1 Profile Matching on Sensitive OSNs
Note that in D1 and D2, users provide the links to their social networks publicly.
It is quite hard to obtain coupled profiles from social networks where users share
sensitive information such as PatientsLikeMe. We expect to obtain similar results
as long as users share similar attributes across OSNs. Considering that these
users are more privacy-cautious, mostly non-obvious attributes such as interest,
activity, sentiment similarity, or writing style can be used.
6.2 Mitigation Techniques
We foresee that the OSN can provide recommendations to the users (about
the content they share) to reduce their risk for profile matching attacks. Such
recommendation may include (i) generalizing or distorting some shared content
of the user (e.g., generalizing the shared location or posting a content at a later
time); or (ii) choosing not to share some content (especially for attributes that
are hard to generalize or distort, such as interest or sentiment). When generating
such recommendations, there are two main objectives: (i) content shared by the
user should not increase user’s risk for profile matching and (ii) utility of the
content shared by the user (or utility of user’s profile) should not decrease due
to the applied countermeasures. Using a utility metric for the user’s profile, the
proposed framework (in Section 4.3) can be used to formulate an optimization
between the utility of the user’s profile and privacy of the user. The solution of
this optimization problem can provide recommendations to the user about how
to (or whether to) share a new content on their profile.
7 Conclusion
In this work, we have proposed a novel message passing-based framework to
model the profile matching risk in online social networks (OSNs). We have shown
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via simulations that the proposed framework provides comparable accuracy, pre-
cision, and recall compared to the state-of-the-art, while it is significantly more
efficient in terms of its computational complexity. We have also shown that by
controlling the structure of the proposed BP-algorithm we can further decrease
the complexity of the algorithm while increasing its accuracy. We believe that
the proposed framework will be instrumental for OSNs to educate their users
about the consequences of their online sharings. It will also pave the way towards
real-time privacy risk quantification in OSNs against profile matching attacks.
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Appendix
A Scalability of the BP-Based Algorithm
We study the effect of the OSNs’ size to precision and recall of the proposed
algorithm. In Section 5.4, we provided the results when the number of users
in OSN T is fixed. Here, we provide the results of the other two scenarios. In
Figure 7, for each dataset, we show the precision/recall values of the BP-based
algorithm when the number of users in the target OSN (OSN T ) increases while
the number of auxiliary users (i.e., users in OSN A) is fixed. We set the number
of users in OSN A as 1000 and increase the number of users in OSN T from 100
to 1000 in steps of 100.
In Figure 8, for each dataset, we show the precision/recall values of the BP-
based algorithm when the number of users in both OSNs (i.e., OSN A and T )
increases from 100 to 1000 in steps of 100. In both scenarios, we observe that the
precision/recall values of the proposed algorithm only slightly decrease with the
increase of the number of users in the target OSN, or the increase of the number
of users in both OSNs, which shows the scalability of our proposed algorithm.
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Fig. 7. The effect of target OSN’s (OSN T ) size to precision/recall when the size of
auxiliary OSN (OSN A) is 1000 in D1, D2, and D3.
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Fig. 8. The effect of auxiliary and target OSNs’ (OSN A and T ) size to precision/recall
in D1, D2, and D3.
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Fig. 9. The effect of auxiliary
OSN’s (OSN A) size to preci-
sion/recall when the size of target
OSN (OSN T ) is 1000 in D3.
To further check the effect of the auxil-
iary OSN’s size to precision and recall of the
BP-based algorithm, we quantify the preci-
sion/recall values obtained by the proposed
algorithm for larger scales in D3. We fix the
number of users in the target OSN (i.e., OSN
T ) to 1000 while the number of users in the
auxiliary OSN (i.e., OSN A) increases from
1000 to 8000 in steps of 1000 (in Figure 4 the
number of users in OSN T was fixed to 100
while the number of users in OSN A was in-
creasing from 100 to 1000). We show the re-
sults for D3 in Figure 9. The precision/recall
values slightly decrease with the increase of the number of users in OSN A,
confirming the scalability of the proposed algorithm. Note that, in D3, we only
use the graph connectivity attribute for profile matching. We expect that the
decrease in precision/recall values will be smaller when both the graphical struc-
ture and other attributes of the users are used to generate the model.
